Bridgewater State University

Virtual Commons - Bridgewater State University
History Faculty Publications

History Department

2014

Conceiving the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union in the
Midst of the Cold War: Internal and International
Factors
Ethan Sanders
Bridgewater State University, ethan.sanders@bridgew.edu

Virtual Commons Citation
Sanders, Ethan (2014). Conceiving the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union in the Midst of the Cold War: Internal and International Factors.
In History Faculty Publications. Paper 42.
Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/history_fac/42

This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts.

African Review Vol. 41, No. 1, 2014: 35-70

Conceiving the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union in the Midst of the
Cold War: Internal and International Factors

Ethan R. Sanders*
Abstract
To what extent was international pressure placed on Nyerere and
Karume to unify their two states in April 1964? The argument made is
that even though Americans were initially very pleased with the
outcome of the Union—because they thought it would help stem the
spread of communism in the region—this was not a Western-initiated
plan forced upon East African leaders. Indeed, the evidence shows that
Americans were largely in the dark and in fact very frustrated by their
lack of influence on the situation. Instead, the Union merely served as a
confluence of African and American interests. The internal factors are
inspected by highlighting African concerns over outside interference,
worries about domestic stability, and a desire by Karume to consolidate
his power. Finally, the traditional conceptualization of the TanganyikaZanzibar Union as being either a product of the Cold War or an
example of Pan-African idealism will be re-examined.
Introduction
On 20 April 1964 the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar was agreed
upon in principal by Abeid Karume and Julius Nyerere in a closed door
meeting in Dar es Salaam attended by only a small handful of high-level
ministers. Two days later across the Zanzibar Channel the two heads of state
signed the Articles of Union, binding the states together in a political merger.
The question that historians and other commentators are still trying to
straighten out fifty years later is why, exactly? The standard reply for years
has been that the Union was a shining example of the ideals of PanAssistant Professor, Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts, E-mail:
ethan.sanders@bridgew.edu. The author would like to thank James R. Brennan
for his helpful insights on the role of Oscar Kambona in helping to establish the
Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.
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Africanism and served as the model which proved that there could be
political unity between African nations. However, in 1989 author and activist
Amrit Wilson came out with the provocative thesis that the Union was not an
African initiative, but was engineered and orchestrated by the Americans
and British in order to stop the spread of communism in eastern Africa. In
her view the United Republic of Tanzania was an American and British
creation through the means of manipulation and subterfuge.1 This
interpretation seemed feasible in light of the revelations about the CIA’s
involvement in the Congo just prior to the Zanzibar Revolution that
demonstrated the obvious lengths Americans were willing to go in order to
engender regime change in Africa.2 As tensions have risen between the
mainland and the islands in the last few years, this debate over the role of
foreigners in engineering the Union has been discussed by prominent
academics Issa Shivji3 and Haroub Othman, writer Godfrey Mwakikagile, as
well as a host of commentators in the Tanzanian media and the East African
blogosphere.
A close reading of recently released American National Security files, CIA
documents and interviews with the Tanganyikan Attorney General who
drafted the Articles of Union, reveals that while the Americans were initially
very pleased with the outcome of the Union—because they thought it would
help minimize the influence of the “radical elements” in the Zanzibar
Revolutionary Council and stem the spread of communism in the region—
this was not an American or British initiated plan forced upon East African
leaders. Indeed, the evidence shows that the Americans were largely in the
dark and in fact very frustrated by their lack of influence on the situation
with regional leaders. The idea of federating Tanganyika and Zanzibar was
clearly an African one, an idea which had its own long and complicated
history stretching back to the 1940s well before Anglo-American concerns
over the Zanzibar Revolution. The actualization of the union agreement in
April of 1964, however, was principally the responsibility of two individuals,
Julius Nyerere and Abeid Karume, and was built out of both their longtime
interests and desires as well as their complex concerns over the evolving
situation in the early months of 1964. Therefore the Union between
Tanganyika and Zanzibar served as a confluence of interests. It helped meet
the needs of the principle African leaders involved and was also an outcome
that the Americans were temporarily pleased with as they thought it would
be beneficial to their own geopolitical interests. However, neither the
Americans nor the British were the prime movers or significant shapers of
this plan. Instead, the Union was conceived by Africans and largely
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fashioned by Nyerere and Karume’s key advisers, Tanganyikan Minister of
External Affairs, Oscar Kambona, and Zanzibari Vice President Abdulla
Kassim Hanga. It was the agendas of the two heads of state and the initiative
shown by a few of their top ministers that guided the unification process.
The merger was not a plan cooked up by British or American agents and
diplomats and then forced upon the leaders of these two nascent postcolonial states.
This paper is not concerned with the legality or legacy of the Union, but will
focus on the narrower question of what was the extent of the international
pressure placed on Karume and Nyerere, and is there any evidence that the
Union was conceived by the CIA, the American State Department or the
British Foreign Office? This paper will retrace the days and events just after
the Zanzibar Revolution in January 1964 through the mid part of 1964, after
the Union had been implemented, in order to try and untangle who knew
what and when. What then follows is a brief examination of the historical
background of the African idea of federating Tanganyika and Zanzibar and
the connection of Karume and Nyerere to those discussions of African unity
from the mid-1940s continuing through discussions of federation in the late
1950s and 1960s. This historical perspective, which is often missing in the
debates about the Union, will be used to help give a fuller picture of the
internal, or East African, factors going into the decision to unite politically.
Zanzibar: East Africa’s Guinea?
Much has been said about the American and British concerns that postrevolutionary Zanzibar would become “an African Cuba,” serving as a
bridgehead for the spread of communism into the African continent.
Certainly in the hours immediately following the Revolution this had already
developed into a principal concern of American diplomats in East Africa
such as the American Ambassador to Tanganyika, William Leonhart, who
along with the Western media would repeatedly use this phrase over the
next several months.4 (Somewhat ironically, however, the first use of the
term may have been introduced by President Nyerere himself who suggested
in a conversation with Leonhart on the night of the Revolution that the
former Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP)-led government was “far more
likely to produce an ‘east African Cuba,’” than any government led by Abeid
Karume.)5 Nonetheless, the American concern was very real as seen in the
statement put out the day after the Revolution by the US State Department’s
Director of Intelligence and Research entitled, “The Communist Spectre
Looms in Zanzibar.” The central concern from the start was to try and
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distinguish who in the new revolutionary government was a “moderate” or a
“genuinely African nationalist,” and who was a communist-inspired radical.6
This was in line with an emerging belief in the American government that all
true African nationalists were by definition non-aligned because they wanted
their nations to be sovereign and not dependent on any other non-African
state—whether capitalist or communist in orientation. Despite this
oversimplified view, American policy since the Kennedy years had been to
show goodwill to any African nationalists who favoured a non-aligned
foreign policy, because this was deemed the most realistic and safest play in
Cold War geo-politics.7
From the start the Americans believed that Abdulrahman Babu was the most
dangerous and potentially subversive member in the new Zanzibar
government, the Revolutionary Council (RC). They believed he was a
committed “communist, Chinese variety” who was loyal to Beijing. In fact,
they felt certain the Chinese had supported Babu in the past and would back
his bid to take control of the government if the opportunity arose. 8 Other
leaders initially seen as communist threats included Abdulla Kassim Hanga,
who was believed to be Soviet-trained but whose primary orientation was
towards African nationalism; and finally the Americans believed (incorrectly
through bad MI-5 information) that self-styled Field Marshall John Okello—
the military commander of the insurrection—and his armed thugs were all
Cuban-trained.9 Towards the other end of the spectrum was Karume who
was credited as being a “genuine African nationalist” and was clearly seen as
the most popular politician in the islands and therefore deserving of Western
support, even if he was viewed as “ignorant and inept.”10
Just three days after the Revolution the US State Department was already
concerned that no “concrete efforts” were being pursued by East African
governments or the United Kingdom to keep Zanzibar from being drawn
into the communist camp.11 Over the coming weeks the Americans began
contemplating a myriad of different plans for influencing the situation. All of
these various strategies were discussed via a flurry of telegrams and face to
face meetings between American diplomats and their British counterparts.
Few, however, were ever implemented—to the great frustration of a number
of American and British officials.
Already by 17 January the CIA was reporting that they believed a “power
struggle seem[ed] likely between African nationalist and pro-communist
elements” in the Revolutionary Council.12 William Leonhart thought the first
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step in helping shore up support for Karume and the moderates would be to
give American diplomatic recognition to the Revolutionary Council.13 The
ambassador believed that this would give substance to the new
government’s profession of non-alignment, help prove America’s friendly
disposition towards the regime, and bolster the “African nationalist”
character of the Revolutionary Council. But this early plan was foiled
because the British were balking on the issue of recognition until they felt the
situation became more settled. Their inaction tied American hands because
US policy since the Eisenhower administration was that America would let
Britain take the lead when it came to issues in their former African colonies.14
Thus they would not recognize the new government until the British did so
first. This entangling policy of relying on the British would continue to
muddle the Anglo-American response to the Zanzibar situation in the
following weeks.
A new East African crisis, however, would momentarily draw AngloAmerican attention away from the events in Zanzibar. Between January 19
and 24 army battalions in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya all mutinied over
issues of pay. To the dismay and shame of Nyerere, Ugandan Prime Minister
Milton Obote and Kenyan Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta, all three had to ask
their former colonial masters to send military assistance to help restore order
in their countries.15 The British military intervention in these East African
states did more than just distract the Americans and British from the
developments in Zanzibar, it also provided the inspiration for a new course
of action across the Zanzibar Channel. The use of British soldiers to pacify
the situations on the mainland prompted Leonhart to wonder if a precedent
had now been made for British intervention in Zanzibar. Recognizing that
British warships were already in the vicinity and that the new mood in the
region might now be more favourable to British military action, Leonhart
recommended that the East African leaders persuade Karume to request
British assistance in disarming some of the gun-slinging bands roaming
Zanzibar’s alleyways and remove any undesirable individuals that Karume
might want gone. By this time a couple of hundred Tanganyikan police
officers had already been requested by Karume to restore order in the
islands, and the idea was that the Brits would not have to land troops, but
just show sufficient force off Zanzibari shores to allow the Tanganyikans to
collect arms under the shadows of British warships. One interesting aspect of
this plan was to try and reach Karume through Jomo Kenyatta, whom they
viewed as the best channel to contact Karume, and get him to ask the British
to intervene. Indeed, over the next three months numerous British and
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American diplomats saw Kenyatta as the key to fixing the Zanzibar
conundrum. It was thought that Kenyatta would be more receptive to doing
this favor for the Western powers and that, according to Leonhart, Nyerere
was seen as having too much “on his plate,” and was too indulgent of
Babu.16
Upon receiving Leonhart’s message, American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk,
and Under Secretary of State, George Ball, became greatly concerned about
the situation and were “anxious to compare notes with the British,” and
consult the highest levels of the British government to see what their
response was to such a plan. They made clear that the US would let the
British take the lead, that they “would not provide any military support,” but
that they were assessing non-military forms of assistance. In response, the
British were willing to approach Karume and offer military assistance, but
made it clear that they would only go in on one of two conditions: that
Karume made his request for assistance in writing, or that they had solid
evidence that British lives were in danger. But by 1 February it was clear that
neither of these two conditions existed and that the plan could not be
implemented. Part of the problem stemmed from the fact that the British
High Commissioner to Zanzibar, Timothy Crosthwait, felt he had no
leverage with Karume and that it would be difficult to even find a way to
approach Karume on such a topic. Even if he had broken through to Karume,
British intervention was probably the last thing Karume wanted to see due to
his fears of a Western-led counter-revolution.17
British and American discussions of intervention were soon redirected to the
more immediate crisis of what to do over the impending exile of their
diplomatic staffs owing to their continued delay of granting political
recognition of the new government in Zanzibar. Tensions were only cooled
towards the end of February after the British finally decided to grant
recognition. The Americans followed immediately afterwards that same day.
To American minds, however, British dithering cost them a certain amount
of favor and creditability because their recognition came a full month after
the Cubans, and several weeks after the Soviets, Chinese and several other
socialist countries. But at least the belated recognition enabled both
diplomatic missions to be allowed to return to the islands and reopen their
consulates.18
By early March, though, American Secretary of State Rusk was growing
impatient with waiting to hear what the British “action plan” was to stop the
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spread of communism. Rusk was considering plans for educational and
economic aid, but he wanted to gather together the opinions of all American
diplomats in the region to come up with talking points to send over to the
UK Foreign Office. The first item for consideration was to find a way to
eliminate the influence they believed Babu held over Karume. Rusk again
returned to the idea of approaching East African leaders to explain the
dangers of communism to Karume since the British and Americans’
influence on the Zanzibar government was deemed “negligible” and they
were in no position to reach Karume. Rusk hoped the other three leaders
would be able to talk to Karume without Babu present. Rusk also toyed with
the idea of returning the volatile Field Marshall Okello to Zanzibar who had
been sidelined by Karume and forced to leave the islands. He now believed
Okello to be an opponent of Babu and might serve to “slow down Babu’s”
perceived rapid rise to power. Finally, as will be discussed in greater detail
below, Rusk also suggested one “long-range solution might lie in some form
of federation.”19
The same day Rusk sent out his talking points memo, British High
Commissioner Crosthwait had finally received a meeting with Karume
whose “reception was quite cool.” Far from applying any pressure on
Karume, Crosthwait was not even able to get Karume to extend an invitation
for a routine meeting with the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations, Duncan Sandys, who was currently touring East Africa. Karume
did not see the point when he felt “he no particular business to discuss” with
Sandys.20 Regardless, Sandys met with Karume two days later, but Leonhart
disappointingly noted that only “non-substantive matters were discussed.”21
Leonhart took the opportunity to meet with Sandys and his British
counterpart in Dar es Salaam to brainstorm future plans for Zanzibar. The
newly appointed American chargé d’affairs for Zanzibar, Frank Carlucci, and
William Atwood, the American Ambassador to Kenya, were also present and
the group agreed that Anglo-American political and economic leverage in
Zanzibar was “slight” and they still believed getting Kenyatta to act was the
key to success. Sandys did talk with Kenyatta during his East Africa trip and
encouraged him to meet with Karume, but Mzee was “cool to the idea” and
appeared to have no intention of going. When Sandys responded to Rusk’s
query over a British action plan, he reiterated that the British would only
intervene with an invitation from Karume, and now added the stipulation
that all three East African leaders had to give their approval as well. After his
meetings in Zanzibar and Nairobi he knew this was not going to happen
anytime soon.22
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Because of the growing conviction that the Americans and British had very
little influence with Karume directly, between mid-March and mid-April the
most ubiquitous plan that continued to emanate from London and
Washington D. C. was to encourage Kenyatta to get the other East African
leaders to see Babu as a communist and a threat, and then to get them to
approach Karume and encourage him to take the necessary steps to force out
the left-leaning elements of his government.23 Again, Nyerere was seen as too
“weak” and that Tanganyika was an “unlikely channel” to get to Karume.24
On the ground in East Africa though, Anglo-American diplomats were
coming to believe that this approach was unworkable and would have no
effect. In Nairobi, American chargé Laurence Vass made strong appeals to
Kenyatta to act, but Kenyatta made no promises and it was felt that he was
not actually going to follow through with anything.25 In Zanzibar,
Crosthwait and Carlucci agreed that even if Kenyatta did make a “strong
approach” towards Karume that it would be ineffective.26 Certainly their
own attempts to reach Karume met with no success. Crosswaith complained
that he had “no chance” of meeting alone with Karume, and when Carlucci
scored a visit with Karume later in April and tried to subtly bring up the
issue of “Eastern imperialism,” Karume appears to have shut the
conversation down due his unwillingness to listen to American opinion on
the topic.27 Leonhart would receive a similar rebuff in Dar es Salaam. Despite
Leonhart’s earlier suggestion to Rusk that the Americans “not make another
direct approach [to] Nyerere on Zanzibar but let Kenyatta take the initiative,”
he changed his mind after a March 25th Zanzibar cabinet reshuffle which
allegedly entrenched pro-communists in all the key ministries prompted him
to pluck up the courage to discuss Zanzibar with Nyerere on his next
meeting. Leonhart received a gentle rebuke from Nyerere who blamed
America’s lack of influence with Karume on taking too long to recognize his
government and told Leonhart that Tanganyika would not intervene on
behalf of Americans any more than they had.28
Since it became clear to Leonhart and Carlucci that none of the East African
governments were willing to get involved and attempt to sway Karume, they
both began to consider all sorts of alternate scenarios which they shared with
the State Department between mid-March and mid-April. Carlucci’s ideas
ran the entire gambit from learning to live with Babu and hoping that one
day he would see the “value of true non-alignment,” to creating a local
incident that would serve as a pretext for intervention.29 Carlucci also
considered a high-impact personal item like giving Karume his own
helicopter and pilot.30 Leonhart’s plans were more diplomatic in nature. If
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Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote were unwilling to talk to Karume about the
perils of communism, maybe Americans could encourage other African
leaders such as Sékou Touré and Hastings Banda, or other Commonwealth
leaders to create positive relations with Zanzibar. He considered getting
other international organizations to send special missions, as well as buying
a large amount of cloves from Zanzibar that the Soviets had just reneged
on.31 The State Department liked the idea of encouraging allies to make a
presence in Zanzibar and in early April began asking a number of American
Ambassadors in Africa, Europe, Asia and Australia to approach foreign
governments on establishing a mission or presence in Zanzibar. 32 The
response to this plea to friends seems negligible, but one interesting
development came in a meeting with Visiting Indian High Commissioner
Tandon who suggested to Carlucci that the Americans intervene directly and
that the Indian government, concerned over the treatment of Indians in
Zanzibar, might be willing to assist and send a warship. 33 David Bruce,
American Ambassador to the UK, was the first to respond that this plan was
out of the question, pointing out that “overt American intervention was not
feasible.” This was quickly followed by a message from Tandon’s superiors
in Delhi distancing the government of India from Tandon’s plan and
confirming there would be no naval support from India.34
By mid-April all American hope in East African leaders reversing the course
of events in Zanzibar had “vanished” and the thought of a Karume-invited
British-led military intervention was still seen as out of the question.
Therefore, Thomas Hughes, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, drew up a major internal memorandum on US policy alternatives
for Zanzibar (no foreign dissemination) and submitted it to the Secretary of
State on 15 April. The memo estimated that Zanzibar would soon become the
first fully communist-aligned state in Africa. It was believed that Zanzibar
would indeed become an African Cuba, serving as a showcase of socialist
economic development and an entrepôt for communist propaganda in
Africa. Hughes commented that the best America could hope for at this point
was that Zanzibar would instead one day develop into an East African
Guinea—a reference to the fact that even though post-colonial Guinea
initially became closely aligned with communist countries in order to receive
aid, that after a while they adopted a “genuinely neutralist posture.” Thus,
taking a somewhat defeatist attitude and focusing now on long-term
strategies, Hughes suggested that America had only two options: a) try to
quarantine the island or b) maintain a light Western presence and hope to
take advantage of future opportunities that might materialize. (Hughes did
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concede that uninvited military intervention was a third theoretical option
but argued it was not worth exploring as it would be counterproductive.) It
was thought that quarantining, using the standard Cold War weapons of
blockades, boycotts and embargoes on a struggling Zanzibar economy was
bound to come across as mean spirited and would be resented everywhere
on the African mainland and beyond. Therefore, since isolating Zanzibar was
believed to be ineffective in this case, it was recommended that the best
course of action was to keep lines open, maintain a small presence, and hope
that mainland states would not succumb to Zanzibar’s temptations, but in
time serve as a counter-influence for softening Zanzibar’s leaders. And
maybe, if they were fortunate, tensions arising from the Sino-Soviet rivalry
on the islands would allow for an opening for Americans to return to a
position of influence.35
The comments in the British and American communications during the
preceding month and the tone of this memorandum were clearly born out of
frustration over a lack of Western influence. The Americans obviously
believed that hope was presently lost and they were disappointed that their
East African friends were unwilling to take action. There was one line,
however, in the Hughes memorandum that has gained attention in light of
the events that transpired in the days following its release. In a section
lamenting that the time had almost certainly passed when mainland African
states could reverse the trends in Zanzibar, Hughes wrote glumly that the
“prospects for outflanking Zanzibar’s radicals by drawing the island into
East African regional arrangements also seem unpromising.”36 In the
following days something very similar to this unfolded as it was announced
that Tanganyika and Zanzibar were going to unite. This process eventually
even led to a neutralizing of Babu and other “radicals” like Salim Rashid and
Ali Mafoudh. This has led commentators to question whether Americans had
any foreknowledge of this plan. Was it indeed an idea conceived by
Americans? Were Karume and Nyerere, who signed the Articles of Union
between the two countries, pressured into a decision by Westerners pushing
this plan of federation? We turn to these questions presently.
The Idea of a Union
The very first record in the American files of any discussion about federating
or uniting Tanganyika and Zanzibar came just days after the Revolution
when Oscar Kambona requested a meeting with William Leonhart to discuss
the arrest of Americans in Zanzibar. Meeting at Kambona’s house on January
16, Kambona mentioned that Karume, Hanga and Babu had come to see
44

Conceiving the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union

Nyerere to ask him for police advisers and help. During this initial meeting
the Zanzibar delegation “said they would like to discuss union or federal
relationship with Tanganyika in [the] near future.” This piece of information
must not have initially struck Leonhart as too important because he made no
comment on it in his report nor did he bring it up with Nyerere at his next
meeting with the Tanganyikan president.37 This exchange at Kambona’s
house was reported by the CIA a couple of days later.38 (Most CIA reports at
this time were commentaries based on gleanings from State Department
telegrams as they did not have any agents on the ground in Zanzibar during
the weeks following the Revolution.)39 This first mention of some sort of
union or federation is illuminating because it indicates several things. First,
the very idea of some sort of federation or union was first brought up by
Kambona, and not the Americans. Moreover, American understanding (and
misunderstanding) of such a plan was always based on the information they
received from Africans. Second, it shows that Babu was privy to the early
discussions of federation. Finally, it demonstrates that there may be some
evidence that the idea was first suggested by Karume and not Nyerere,
although there is quite a bit of disagreement on this point as various parties
involved have told different versions.40
A little over a week later Kambona again mentioned to Leonhart that “the
new GOZ [Government of Zanzibar] leaders continued to press for early EA
Federation including Zanzibar.” Kambona’s response to the Zanzibaris was
that it was still too controversial to be undertaken quickly because the AfroShirazi Party, the political party that made up the bulk of the Revolutionary
Council, had long been accused of being mainland agents. He told the
visitors that he felt Zanzibar should exist as an independent state for some
months before discussions on federation resumed.41 Whether or not this is
exactly how the discussion between Kambona and the Zanzibar leaders
unfolded, or instead just how Kambona wanted Leonhart to think they
unfolded, cannot be ascertained. However, it does speak to the fact that
Tanganyikan-Zanzibar discussions on federation or union began almost
immediately after the Revolution and that initially the discussions were
focused on a larger East African Federation and not just a partnership
between the two countries.
After Kambona’s second mention of high level discussions about federation,
Leonhart and the State Department took more notice of this idea and
wondered if it was worth further exploration to see if some sort of federal
solution could possibly help alleviate the communist threat in the islands.
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Coming just after the mainland mutinies when the US was contemplating a
number of actions including a British military intervention and approaching
East African leaders to do more to help, Secretary of State Rusk asked
Leonhart to arrange a meeting to discuss the Zanzibar situation with
Nyerere. He gave Leonhart a list of twelve questions to ask Nyerere which
were mostly focused on obtaining Nyerere’s assessment on the situation and
various Zanzibar actors, but also to see if Tanganyikan or Kenyan police
could do more to support Karume and disarm the communist elements. The
very last question was, “What are Nyerere[’s] views on possible federation
Zanzibar with Tanganyika”?42 Nyerere’s answer to Leonhart the next day
was that even though he was much closer with the current government of
Zanzibar than the previous one, that, “there was not practical possibility of
Federation Zanzibar and Tanganyika alone and EA Federation ‘very distant
prospect.’”43 Nothing was made of this at the time, but it did alter American
perception that Nyerere was unwilling to have a federation between the two
countries, and that if anything was to happen it needed to be a regional
federation in which Kenyatta was again believed to be the key.
The next mention of a federation in the American correspondence was not
until a month later when there were a flurry of meetings and discussions to
devise a new action plan. In Rusk’s talking points memo sent out to the
various American diplomats involved (mentioned above), he noted that one
“long-range solution might lie in some form of federation.” He observed the
government of Zanzibar’s possible interest in a federation from Leonhart’s
earlier reports and wondered if Nyerere might be asked again about this
issue despite his “previous objections [to the] idea.” However, because
Nyerere was viewed as unwilling to go it alone, and because it was believed
Kenyatta was more concerned over Babu than Nyerere was, Rusk thought it
best to seek Kenyatta out first to see if the Kenyan prime minister would not
raise the issue with Nyerere in a discussion about a larger East African
federation.44 But the consensus that March at the meeting between Sandys,
Leonhart, Carlucci and the others in Dar es Salaam was that the Americans
“nor the British believe Tanganyika-Zanzibar Federation practical
possibility.” They suggested the only “outside chance Nyerere might
consider” some form of federation was if Kenyatta was willing to bring
Kenya into a regional federation.45 Once again the idea was dropped and it
would be another month before there was any revival of British or American
interest in this outcome.
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The next brief mention of a potential federal arrangement was only in a
passing comment in early April when a distressed Nyerere approached
Leonhart and shared his grave concerns over a rumor about a 2500-strong
Arab force training to prepare to invade Zanzibar and retake it for the Sultan.
Nyerere asked both the American and German ambassadors if they had any
intelligence about this counter-revolutionary force. Leonhart obviously did
not and in fact wondered if this frantic plea was not some sort of political
cover by Nyerere to send more Tanganyikan troops to Pemba, or possibly
some form of incorporation “by Kenya or Tanganyika or both.”46 More
substantially, American interests were again raised a couple of days later in
light of the impending East African Federation talks between Kenyatta,
Nyerere and Obote to be held in Nairobi on 10 April. The day before on their
way to this conference a Zanzibar delegation stopped in Dar es Salaam to
have a meeting with Tanganyikan officials. Hanga, Babu and Twala were at
this meeting but Karume was not present due to the illness of his wife.
Mbwambo, the Tanganyika Chief of Protocol, informed Leonhart that the
major topic was whether or not Zanzibar would seek membership in the East
African Federation. Mbwambo would not elaborate any further, but he
revived American interests in such an arrangement. Babu and Hanga
attended the meeting in Nairobi as spectators as “the big three” tried to
hammer out a plan. According to Kenyan minister Murumbi this meeting
went poorly. The climax came when Nyerere gave the emotional plea, “We
want federation now!” Kenyatta instantly agreed, but Obote went silent. It is
questionable whether Kenyatta was truly eager for federation, but the result
of these talks made it clear that there would be no East African Federation, or
at least not anytime soon.47 It was the following week that Hughes put out
his major memorandum on US alternatives sombrely stating that any hopes
of minimizing radicals through a regional federation were extremely
doubtful.
It was the day after Hughes’ memo was written that Leonhart first
discovered that there were serious talks scheduled to take place to discuss
some sort of political arrangement between Zanzibar and Tanganyika
without Kenya or Uganda. Reporting on a private meeting he had with
Kambona on 16 April, Leonhart explained that Kambona had come to him in
“the strictest confidence” that secret talks had begun with certain Zanzibar
leaders regarding a Tanganyika-Zanzibar federation after the breakdown of
the East African Federation talks in Nairobi. He mentioned specifically
working with Abdulla Hanga, his long-time friend since their university
days in London in the 1950s, as well as Saleh Saadalla, but specifically
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pointed out that cutting Babu down to size was an intended outcome of the
federation—a sentiment obviously pleasing to American ears. In his report to
the State Department, William Leonhart questioned whether Nyerere would
support such an initiative, but promised he would keep an eye on
developments with the “Kambona project.”48
Two days later Leonhart received a call from Kambona stating that if the
plan was going to work then the best opportunity would be the upcoming
weekend—a reference to Babu’s absence from Zanzibar on a trip to Asia. He
noted that he had brought other Zanzibar leaders in on the talks, Abdul
Twala who was the acting Foreign Minister while Babu was abroad and
Yusuf Himidi. Kambona had to travel to Tabora that weekend but he had
recruited Harue Tambwe, a TANU stalwart who had strong connections to
Zanzibar, to go talk to Hanga to see what he needed so that the deal could be
sealed within the week. Importantly, Kambona mentioned that Karume had
already “given tentative agreement” to an association and reconfirmed that
the project had Nyerere’s support as well. Believing the plan may actually
have the consent of the two critical players needed to pull off such a project
certainly piqued Leonhart’s attention, but his initial response was still
somewhat cool. Leonhart obviously wanted Babu out of the picture, but the
prospect of a Zanzibar dominated instead by Hanga and Twala was also
unpleasant. In fact, in classic Cold War paranoia style, Leonhart warned
Washington that the Soviets might be behind this plan to unite Tanganyika
and Zanzibar in order to counteract Chinese influence (via Babu) in the
islands, have their man Hanga installed instead and then expand their
influence on the mainland. Leonhart recommended that the US needed to
proceed cautiously and gain more information before they considered giving
full US support to what was still being referred to as Kambona’s plan. 49
When Leonhart informed Carlucci of the secret talks the next day, the
Zanzibar chargé agreed that Hanga was preferable to Babu, but that he too
would hopefully be removed at a later date.50
The response from the State Department was to wait and see what this
“Tanganyikan initiative” for some sort of federation or incorporation would
entail. They thought since it was an “African initiative”—something they
were originally hoping would come through Kenyatta—that this was the best
and maybe even “the only possibility of reversing [the] present critical
situation in Zanzibar.” But they were also wary of stepping in and risking
precipitating Soviet or Chinese involvement, and thus Leonhart was told to
wait for Kambona to come to him before any offers of US assistance were
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made. But certainly the US was willing to give its “blessing” if the plan
would exclude Babu and his clique from power.51
The nature of these American cables indicates that the idea of a TanganyikaZanzibar union was clearly conceived by Tanganyikans and Zanzibaris and
not American diplomats, who even initially suspected the Soviets of being
behind it. When the Articles of Union were signed by Nyerere and Karume
the only Western officials that had any clue of what was happening were
Leonhart, Carlucci and the State Department higher ups back in Washington
like George Ball who had read Leonhart’s incoming telegrams. Subsequent
cables indicate that the American Embassies in Nairobi and Kampala were
still in the dark, as were all of the British officials who as of the 22 nd of April
were still talking about putting pressure on Kenyatta to talk to Karume.52
Moreover, in the following days it became clear that the Americans and
British were anxious over the feasibility of what was now being referred to as
Nyerere’s evolving strategy or the “African solution.”53 The African formula
brought with it the possibility of reactionary violence or, maybe worse,
conniving counter-plans by Babu and his followers to use the larger
mainland platform to spread their radical influence even wider. Less than a
week after the Union the British and Americans were complaining that little
had been done to reduce communist influence in the islands and they once
again began considering alternative courses of action to bring “outside
forces” to bear on the situation. Again, this hand-wringing and strategizing
happened mostly at the level of internal discussions between Americans and
their British allies and there was little direct action taken. Different kinds of
support for Nyerere and Karume were considered, both “quiet support” as
well as gifts of aid and other assistance. Previous strategies were dragged
back out such as getting other African leaders to persuade Karume or
Nyerere to cement the union and the non-aligned character of the new Union
government. There were also contingency plans for military intervention and
sending in emergency forces.54 It was not until the very end of June that the
Americans felt they could breathe a little easier and that they were “at [the]
end this overheated period.” For the foreseeable future it looked as if the
Union would last and that the African plan had gone a long way to reduce
the threat of Zanzibar becoming a communist bastion in Africa.55
Internal Motivations behind the Union
The Union was not an Anglo-American idea and the process of political
unification was not pushed through due to direct pressure from the
Americans, British or any other outside forces promoting such a plan. But if
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Karume and Nyerere did not give in to “irresistible pressure from Western
powers,” it remains to be asked what factors compelled these two African
leaders to take this extraordinary step?56 The answer to this question has
usually been formulated in an either/or construct, it was either PanAfricanism or a product of Cold War. But in order to fully answer this
question, one must understand the complicated local power dynamics, the
inter-personal relationships that were at play, and importantly, understand
that the aims of Pan-Africanism cannot be extracted from the problems of
decolonization and the Cold War from which it was born.
The first thing to point out was that many of the players involved had a
certain amount of idealism regarding African unity, what one might call the
more romantic side of Pan-Africanism. Many of the Afro-Shirazi and TANU
politicians had cut their political teeth in the African Association in the 1940s,
a group declaring that all Africans were one and whose motto was “Umoja ni
Nguvu” (Unity is Strength). As early as 1947 the members of this transterritorial organization explicitly declared at an Association-wide conference
that they were willing to see the political federation of Tanganyika and
Zanzibar. At this time both Karume and Nyerere were heavily involved in
the Association and Karume was undoubtedly at the conference and among
those that passed the resolution supporting federation while Nyerere, if not
in attendance himself, would have certainly read about the resolution
through the organization’s highly-organized communication network.57 The
desirability of such a federation was again confirmed in 1958 when leaders of
the ASP and TANU agreed that they wanted to amalgamate the countries
into one republic after independence had been achieved.58 The general
atmosphere throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s was very pro-unity, to
the point where declaring loyalty to the ideals of Pan-Africanism was
widespread. This genuine, if not surface-level, desire for political unification
is likely part of the reason why Babu had been interested in unifying some of
the countries in East Africa as seen in his participation in a number of
discussions on federation and his later assent to the “idea of unity.”59 It can
also be seen in Aboud Jumbe’s response on the discovery that the union had
taken place in his absence. When Karume asked his opinion, Jumbe’s
instinctual reaction was, “unity is strength.”60
But as the case in the rest of Africa has seemed to prove over the years, the
ideals of unity and the discussions of Pan-Africanism rarely translated into
transfers of power or political unification or federation. Thus other factors
must have helped precipitate the unification of these two states. In the case of
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post-Revolutionary Zanzibar and Tanganyika it seems to have been a
concern over outside intervention, a mutual reliance on the outcome of each
state for purposes of domestic stability, and a desire by Karume and those
loyal to him to consolidate his position and power.
From the standpoint of Karume and the Revolutionary Council, they very
clearly relied on the help and support of the Tanganyikans after the
unexpected Revolution. The new leaders had been thrust into the position of
having to first calm the situation and then start providing for the people of
the islands in this post-crisis period. Zanzibaris immediately turned to longtime allies and friends in Dar es Salaam for assistance. In the week following
the Revolution there were multiple trips to the Tanganyikan capital by
Hanga and Babu and even a trip by Karume himself to request various
support from the Tanganyikan government. They needed medical experts
and supplies, technicians to restore essential services, help in organizing a
police force and basic food items. Nyerere sent a Tanganyikan police force to
help restore order along with medical supplies, sugar and other food stuffs in
aid. Karume also turned to Nyerere for guidance in how to deal with
political liabilities, ex-government ministers he wanted removed from the
scene, and the problematic John Okello who had given Karume his position,
but who could not be trusted in the new cabinet.61
From the record it appears that it was during these initial talks about Okello
and assistance that the idea of unifying the two states was specifically
discussed in light of Karume’s political concerns. Karume not only saw the
mainland as a place where he could get rid of his political adversaries, but it
seems likely that he felt Tanganyika’s assistance could help stave off foreign
intervention from a number of directions. From the beginning Karume was
deeply concerned about a counter-revolution. He was highly suspicious of
both the Americans and the British whom he felt had supported the outgoing
regime, and at several points over the early months of 1964 he appeared
concerned they would try to reinstate the old order. They had shored up the
other post-independence East African regimes after the mutinies, why would
they not help the ZNP government as well? He even arrested four American
journalists he believed to be “CIA Counter Revolutionaries.” This deep
mistrust explains in part his coolness towards the Americans and British
throughout the period.62 But Karume also apparently feared a number of
Arab Gulf monarchies whom he believed wanted to reinstall the Sultan.63
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In the months following the Revolution Karume’s growing concern centered
on the rising power of Abdulrahman Babu and other non-Afro-Shirazi Party
members of the Revolutionary Council like Ali Mafoudh who had become
the defacto commander of Zanzibar’s armed forces after the removal of
Okello.64 Karume and Babu had been thrust into their positions by Okello
who intentionally wanted members from both the ASP and the recently
banned Umma Party of Babu to serve in the Revolutionary Council after he
overthrew the ZNP-led government.65 Even though Karume worked with
Babu out of necessity at first, inside sources indicate that there were always
real fault lines between those RC members who were leaders of the ASP
before the Revolution and those who were not. Indeed, there was deep
mistrust and opposition towards Babu by some ASP leaders.66 Certainly, the
progression of events and the way in which the Union was pushed through
clearly indicate that sidelining Babu and consolidating Karume’s power and
influence in the islands was a central motivation on the Zanzibar side.
Babu had been involved in early talks regarding some form of federation in
January and again in early April, but the timing of the final agreement was
intentionally arranged to align with his trip to Asia. There had been previous
private meetings between Karume and Nyerere, but events sped up rapidly
once it was clear that a larger East African federation was not going to
happen and Babu was going to be away from Zanzibar. In the week leading
up to the signing and ratification of the Articles of Union, when messages
were going back and forth between Kambona and Hanga, Kambona made it
clear that if anything was going to happen it needed to be within the next
week and the reason must have been to avoid any efforts by Babu to block
the agreement.67 This is corroborated by the Tanganyikan Attorney General,
Roland Brown, who had been secretly brought into knowledge about the
potential union by Nyerere who wanted him to draft a legal document laying
out how a union agreement would work. With Babu’s temporary absence,
tremendous pressure was put on Brown to finish the Articles of Union
quickly so that Nyerere and Karume could sign them before Babu’s return.68
After secretly meeting in Dar es Salaam on 18, 19 and 20 April, Karume and
Nyerere finally came to an agreement.69 The last touches to the Articles were
completed and brought to Zanzibar by Nyerere, Kambona, Job Lusinde, the
Minister of Home Affairs, and three other Tanganyikans. The signing
between Karume and Nyerere was also witnessed by some of Karume’s top
advisers including Abdulla Kassim Hanga and Abdul Twala who had both
been in on the secret talks.70 The Articles were then whisked away by
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Kambona and Roland Brown to be shown to Kenyatta and Obote in Nairobi
and Kampala, respectively, who had both been excluded from any
knowledge about the talks. (There were concerns they would be upset for not
previously being made aware of the secret talks.) After giving Karume and
Hanga a couple of days to politic for the Union, the Articles were then
returned to Zanzibar with Kambona, Lusinde and Brown for their ratification
by the Revolutionary Council on the evening of 25 April. Brown was sent to
the ratification to answer any legal questions which were raised, but was
asked to sit outside the meeting.71 Salim Rashid had tried to stall the meeting
until Babu’s return (which ended up being later that night) by bringing in a
lawyer from Uganda to raise legal objections with Karume. Karume was
undeterred by his meeting with the lawyer earlier that afternoon,72 and the
ratification meeting went ahead even without the presence of several
Revolutionary Council members, including Rashid who was possibly on his
way to pick up Babu from the airport.73 A passionate plea was given by
Hanga that the Union was necessary and that the Articles must be approved.
Hanga was clearly Karume’s closest ally who had stuck by the Sheikh during
an earlier period of division within the ASP, he had a long-time personal
relationship with Kambona, and being Karume’s number two he also stood
to gain the most by having Babu’s power checked.74 The ratification by the
Revolutionary Council took longer than expected, but Karume received the
endorsement of enough members, with several others abstaining.75 With the
approval of the RC, Kambona, Lusinde and Brown immediately headed back
to Dar es Salaam where the Tanganyika National Assembly was waiting on
their return to start the process for Tanganyikan approval. This was a much
smoother process with nothing but positive speeches led by Nyerere
himself.76
The manoeuvre was complete, but Kambona was still concerned about how
Babu would react to the news, telling Leonhart that “If Babu agrees, he will
be a fool, but he may do so.”77 Babu finally met with Karume the next day
and the president reportedly told him in front of other ministers that the
Revolutionary Council had “voted unanimously in favor of Union,” (only if
one did not count the abstentions) and that “he could either agree or resign.”
The extremely bright Babu must have recognized that something subversive
was afoot and decided not to challenge Karume at that moment but carefully
responded that “he agreed with the idea of Union.”78 When the new Union
cabinet was announced the following day Babu was given a high position,
but one in Dar es Salaam directly under Nyerere and away from the
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Zanzibar scene.79 Babu was the first casualty of Karume’s use of the Union
arrangement to clip the wings of political threats in the island.80
Nyerere, Kambona and Lusinde also wanted to see Babu’s influence
diminished, although not for reasons of securing personal power, but due to
a desire to avoid external interference in African affairs. For them, Babu was
just one part of a larger concern over foreign intervention. Similar to the
Americans, the Tanganyikans too were concerned about too much
communist influence in Zanzibar, but for slightly different reasons. Nyerere
and Lusinde both thought a prosperous communist-backed Zanzibar would
serve to destabilize the domestic scene within Tanganyika. If the small
islands were turned into a showcase of the financial fruits of aligning with
the socialist powers, Nyerere was afraid it would undermine all his claims
that remaining non-aligned held out the best solution for Tanganyikans.81
Lusinde too was worried about potential contrasts between Dar es Salaam
and Zanzibar, noting that it was the urban poor who were involved in acts of
mob violence during the mutiny and who were the most likely to cause
problems for the government. They needed no new inspiration from
Zanzibar social revolutions.82
Direct intervention from outsiders, be it the West, the Soviets or the Chinese,
was something that needed to be avoided according to the minds of Nyerere
and Kambona. Kambona was concerned that Karume was making the
mistake of relying too heavily on the various communist groups that were
promising aid and giving military assistance. He was concerned that they
were “trying to smother Karume with advisers and aid, never giving him
time or room to stand off and see what’s happening,” and Kambona was also
offended that the Soviets and Chinese were acting like Africans could not
think for themselves. Kambona noted that the union was a “gamble” but that
something had to be done before the “Easterners” took over the island. He
felt it was the mainland African states’ responsibility to help keep Zanzibari
Africans from such a fate.83
On the other hand, Nyerere was also concerned over a possible Western
military intervention in Zanzibar. Even though Nyerere never received any
direct pressure from the West to unite Tanganyika and Zanzibar, (as
demonstrated above and confirmed by Roland Brown)84 he was aware of
discussions over British military intervention which created a type of indirect
burden to do something to find an African solution to the problem before
there was another embarrassing show of force by the ex-colonial powers.85
54

Conceiving the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union

Nyerere did not want either side in the Cold War meddling in the affairs of
East Africa. This is seen in part through his constant rebuffs of US and British
assistance when it was offered in the early months of 1964.86 This concern
also played into his reasoning for why he was willing to take on the risk of
merging with Zanzibar without the other East African states. Even though
some form of union between Tanganyika and the Zanzibar islands had long
been discussed, it was still only second best to Nyerere’s larger vision of an
East African Federation. Nonetheless, the exigencies of the situation
compelled Nyerere to act.
So was this Pan-African idealism? The answer can only be yes if one
recognizes the strong utilitarian strand in the Pan-African Movement of the
1950s and early 1960s. The desire for African unity was born out of the desire
to fight imperialism in all of its forms and was imbued by the Spirit of
Bandung which sought a way out of the binary world of the Cold War. The
Pan-African Manifesto and the All-African People’s Congress promoted a
united and strong Africa which would not tolerate interference from any of
the big powers and which hoped to solve its own problems and become a
significant player on the world stage.87 Thus the Union was not founded
solely on some abstract or romantic notion of unity, but it was forged
through a process shaped by both Karume’s concerns over losing power and
Nyerere’s utilitarian Pan-Africanism that desired to protect Zanzibaris, and
ultimately Tanganyikans, from non-African intervention into East African
affairs.
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